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Abstract. Program verifiers are not exempt from the bugs that affect nearly ev-
ery piece of software. In addition, they often exhibit brittle behavior: their perfor-
mance changes considerably with details of how the input program is expressed—
details that should be irrelevant, such as the order of independent declarations.
Such a lack of robustness frustrates users who have to spend considerable time
figuring out a tool’s idiosyncrasies before they can use it effectively.
This paper introduces a technique to detect lack of robustness of program veri-
fiers; the technique is lightweight and fully automated, as it is based on testing
methods (such as mutation testing and metamorphic testing). The key idea is to
generate many simple variants of a program that initially passes verification. All
variants are, by construction, equivalent to the original program; thus, any variant
that fails verification indicates lack of robustness in the verifier.
We implemented our technique in a tool called µgie, which operates on programs
written in the popular Boogie language for verification—used as intermediate
representation in numerous program verifiers. Experiments targeting 135 Boogie
programs indicate that brittle behavior occurs fairly frequently (16 programs) and
is not hard to trigger. Based on these results, the paper discusses the main sources
of brittle behavior and suggests means of improving robustness.
1 Introduction
Automated program verifiers have become complex pieces of software; inevitably, they
contain bugs that make them misbehave in certain conditions. Verification tools need
verification too.
In order to apply verification techniques to program verifiers, we have to settle on
the kind of (correctness) properties to be verified. If we simply want to look for basic
programming errors—such as memory allocation errors, or parsing failures—the usual
verification1 techniques designed for generic software—from random testing to static
analysis—will work as well on program verifiers. Alternatively, we may treat a program
verifier as a translator that encodes the semantics of a program and specification lan-
guage into purely logic constraints—which can be fed to a generic theorem prover. In
this case, we may pursue a correct-by-construction approach that checks that the trans-
lation preserves the intended semantics—as it has been done in few milestone research
achievements [31,24].
There is a third kind of analysis, however, which is peculiar to automated program
verifiers that aim at being sound. Such tools input a program complete with specifica-
tion and other auxiliary annotations, and output either “Ë SUCCESS” or “é FAILURE”.
1 In this paper, the term “verification” also designates validation techniques such as testing.
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Success means that the verifier proved that the input program is correct; but failure may
mean that the program is incorrect or, more commonly, that the verifier needs more in-
formation to verify the program—such as more detailed annotations. This asymmetry
between “verified” and “don’t know” is a form of incompleteness, which is inevitable
for sound verifiers that target expressive, undecidable program logics. Indeed, using
such tools often requires users to become acquainted with the tools’ idiosyncrasies,
developing an intuition for what kind of information, and in what form, is required for
verification to succeed. To put it in another way, program verifiers may exhibit brittle, or
unstable, behavior: tiny changes of the input program that ought to be inconsequential
have a major impact on the effectiveness achieved by the program verifier. For instance,
Sec. 2 details the example of a small program that passes or fails verification just ac-
cording to the relative order of two unrelated declarations. Brittle behavior of this kind
compromises the usability of verification tools.
In this work, we target this kind of robustness (stability) analysis of program ver-
ifiers. We call an automated verifier robust if its behavior is not significantly affected
by small changes in the input that should be immaterial. A verifier that is not robust is
brittle (unstable): it depends on idiosyncratic features of the input. Using brittle veri-
fiers can be extremely frustrating: the feedback we get as we try to develop a verified
program incrementally is inconsistent, and we end up running in circles—trying to fix
nonexistent errors or adding unnecessary annotations. Besides being a novel research
direction for the verification of verifiers, identifying brittle behavior has the potential of
helping develop more robust tools that are ultimately more usable.
More precisely, we apply lightweight verification techniques based on testing. Test-
ing is a widely used technique that cannot establish correctness but is quite effective at
findings bugs.
The goal of our work is to automatically generate tests that reveal brittleness. Us-
ing the approach described in detail in Sec. 3, we start from a seed: a program that is
correct and can be verified by an automated verifier. We mutate the seed by applying
random sequences of predefined mutation operators. Each mutation operator captures
a simple variation of the way a program is written that does not change its semantics;
for example, it changes the order of independent declarations. Thus, every mutant is a
metamorphic transformation [6] of the seed—and equivalent to it. If the verifier fails
to verify a mutant we found a bug that exposes brittle behavior: seed and mutant differ
only by small syntactic details that should be immaterial, but such tiny details impact
the verifier’s effectiveness in checking a correct program.
While our approach to robustness testing is applicable in principle to any auto-
mated program verifier, the mutation operators depend to some extent on the semantics
of the verifier’s input language, as they have to be semantic preserving. To demonstrate
robustness testing in practice, we focus on the Boogie language [27]. Boogie is a so-
called intermediate verification language, combining an expressive program logic and
a simple procedural programming language, which is commonly used as an intermedi-
ate layer in many verification tools. Boogie’s popularity makes our technique (and our
implementation) immediately useful to a variety of researchers and practitioners.
As we describe in Sec. 3, we implemented robustness testing for Boogie in a tool
called µgie. In experiments described in Sec. 4, we ran µgie on 135 seed Boogie
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programs, generating and verifying over 87 000 mutants. The mutants triggered brittle
behavior in 16 of the seed programs; large, feature-rich programs turned out to be par-
ticularly brittle, to the point where several different mutations were capable of making
Boogie misbehave. As we reflect in Sec. 6, our technique for robustness testing can
be a useful complement to traditional testing techniques, and it can help buttress the
construction of more robust, and thus ultimately more effective and usable, program
verifiers.
Tool availability. The tool µgie, as well as all the artifacts related to its experimental
evaluation, are publicly available [35].
2 Motivating Example
Let’s see a concrete example of how verifiers can behave brittlely. Fig. 1 shows a simple
Boogie program consisting of five declarations, each listed on a separate numbered line.
1 function h(int) returns (int);
2 axiom (∀ x, y : int • x> y =⇒ h(x)> y);
3 const a : [int] int;
4 axiom (∀ i : int • 0≤ i =⇒ a[i]< a [i+ 1]);
5 procedure p(i : int) returns (o : int)
requires i≥ 0; ensures o>a[i]; { o :=h(a[i+ 1]); }
Fig. 1: A correct Boogie program that exposes the brittleness of verifiers: changing the
order of declarations may make the program fail verification.
The program introduces an integer function h (ln. 1), whose semantics is partially
axiomatized (ln. 2); a constant integer map a (ln. 3), whose elements at nonnegative
indexes are sorted (ln. 4); and a procedure p (ln. 5, spanning two physical lines in
the figure)—complete with signature, specification, and implementation—which re-
turns the result of applying h to an element of a. Never mind about the specific na-
ture of the program; we can see that procedure p is correct with respect to its spec-
ification: a[i+ 1]> a[i] from the axiom about a and p’s precondition, and thus
h(a[i+ 1])> a[i] = o from the axiom about h. Indeed, Boogie successfully checks
that p is correct.
There is nothing special about the order of declarations in Fig. 1—after all, “the
order of the declarations in a [Boogie] program is immaterial” [27, Sec. 1]. A different
programmer may, for example, put a’s declarations before h’s. In this case, surprisingly,
Boogie fails verification warning the user that p’s postcondition may not hold.2
A few more experiments show that there’s a fair chance of running into this kind
of brittle behavior. Out of the 5! = 120 possible permutations of the 5 declarations in
Fig. 1—each an equivalent version of the program—Boogie verifies exactly half, and
fails verification of the other half. We could not find any simple pattern in the order
of declarations (such as “line x before line y”) that predicts whether a permutation
corresponds to a program Boogie can verify.
2 The first author found out this at the most inappropriate of times—during a live demo!
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The SMT-LIB [4] files generated by Boogie (encoding the program’s correctness
conditions in a format understood by SMT solvers) also only differ by the order of dec-
larations and assertions—with additional complications due to the fact that declarations
have to come before usage in SMT-LIB, and the VCs also include auxiliary functions
generated by Boogie. The interplay of Boogie and Z3 determines the brittle behavior we
observe in this example: even if it uses a generic format, Boogie’s SMT-LIB encoding
uses plenty of Z3-specific options, but is not always robust in the way it interacts with
the solver. To better understand whether other tools’ SMT encodings may be less brittle
than Boogie’s, we used b2w [1] to translate all 120 permutations of Fig. 1 to WhyML—
the input language of the Why3 intermediate verifier [14]. Why3 successfully verified
all of them—using Z3 as SMT solver, like Boogie does—which suggests that some
features of Boogie’s encoding (as opposed to Z3’s capabilities) are responsible for the
brittle behavior on the example.
Such kinds of brittleness—a program switching from verified to unverified based on
changes that should be inconsequential—can greatly frustrate users, and in particular
novices who are learning the ropes and may get stuck looking for an error in a program
that is actually correct—and could be proved so if definitions were arranged in a slightly
different way. Since brittleness hinders scalability to projects of realistic size, it can also
be a significant problem for advanced users; for example, the developers behind the
Ironclad Apps [20] and IronFleet [19] projects reported3 that “solvers’ instability was a
major issue” in their verification efforts.
Mutant m1 Verifier t Ë
Mutant m2 Verifier t Ë
Seed: program s:
t(s) =Ë
Mutation
generator µgie
...
...
...
Mutant mk Verifier t é
Brittle behavior of t:
t(mk) 6= t(s)
· · · · · · Ë
Mutant mN Verifier t Ë
Fig. 2: How robustness testing of Boogie programs works. We start with a correct program s
that some Boogie tool t can successfully verify; mutation generator µgie mutates s in several
different ways, generating many different mutants mk equivalent to s; each mutant undergoes
verification with tool t; a mutant mk that fails verification with t exposes brittle behavior of t on
the two equivalent correct programs s ≡ mk.
3 By an anonymous reviewer of FM 2018.
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3 How Robustness Testing Works
Robustness testing is a technique that “perturbs” a correct and verified program by
introducing small changes, and observes whether the changes affect the program’s ver-
ifiability. The changes should be inconsequential, because they are designed not to alter
the program’s behavior or specification; if they do change the verifier’s outcome, we
found lack of robustness.
While robustness testing is applicable to any automated program verifier, we focus
the presentation on the popular Boogie intermediate verification language. Henceforth,
a “program” is a program (complete with specification and other annotations) written
in the Boogie language. Fig. 2 illustrates how robustness testing works at a high level;
the rest of the section provides details.
In general terms, testing requires to build a valid input, feed it to the system under
test, and compare the system’s output with the expected output—given by a testing ora-
cle. Testing the behavior of a verifier according to this paradigm brings challenges that
go beyond those involved in generating tests for general programs. First, a verifier’s
input is a whole program, complete with specification and other annotations (such as
lemmas and auxiliary functions) for verification. Second, robustness testing aims at ex-
posing subtle inconsistencies in a verifier’s output, and not basic programming errors—
such as memory access errors, parsing errors, or input/output errors—that every piece
of software might be subject to. Therefore, we need to devise suitable strategies for
input generation and oracle generation.
3.1 Mutation Operators
Input generation. In order to expose brittleness of verifiers, we need to build com-
plex input programs of significant size, complete with rich specifications and all the
annotations that are necessary to perform automated verification. While we may use
grammar-based generation techniques [41] to automatically build syntactically correct
Boogie programs, the generated programs would either have trivial specifications or
not be semantically correct—that is, they would not pass verification. Instead, robust-
ness testing starts from a collection of verified programs—the seeds—and automati-
cally generates simple, semantically equivalent variants of those programs.4 This way,
we can seed robustness testing with a variety of sophisticated verification benchmarks,
and assess robustness on realistic programs of considerable complexity.
Mutation operators. Given a seed s, robustness testing generates many variantsM(s)
of s by “perturbing” s. Building on the basic concepts and terminology of mutation
testing [10,23],5 we call mutant each variant m of a seed s obtained by applying a
random sequence of mutation operators.
A mutation operator captures a simple syntactic transformation of a Boogie pro-
gram; crucially, mutation operators should not change a program’s semantics but only
4 Sec. 4.2 describes some experiments with seeds that fail verification. Unsurprisingly, random
mutations are unlikely to turn an unverified program into a verified one—therefore, the main
paper focuses on using verified programs as seeds.
5 See Sec. 5 for a discussion of how robustness testing differs from traditional mutation testing.
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STRUCTURAL LOCAL GENERATIVE
S1 Swap any two declarations
S2 Split a procedure definition into
declaration and implementation
S3 Move any declaration into a sepa-
rate file (and call Boogie on both
files)
L1 Swap any two local variable dec-
larations
L2 Split a declaration of multiple
variables into multiple declara-
tions
L3 Join any two preconditions into a
conjunctive one
L4 Join any two postconditions into a
conjunctive one
L5 Swap any two pre-/postcondition,
intermediate assertion, or loop in-
variant clauses
L6 Complement an if condition and
switch its then and else branches
G1 Add true as pre-/postcondition,
intermediate assertion, or loop in-
variant clause
G2 Remove a trigger annotation
Table 3: Mutation operators of Boogie code in categories structural, local, and gener-
ative. Operators do not change the semantics of the code they are applied to (except
possibly G2, which is used separately).
introduce equivalent or redundant information. Under this fundamental condition, every
mutant m of a seed s is equivalent to s in the sense that s and m should both pass (or
both fail) verification. This is an instance of metamorphic testing, where we transform
between equivalent inputs so that the seed serves as an oracle to check the expected
verifier output on all of the seed’s mutants.
Based on our experience using Boogie and working around its brittle behavior, we
designed the mutation operators in Tab. 3, which exercise different language features:
Structural mutation operators change the overall structure of top-level declarations—
by changing their relative order (S1), separating declarations and implementations
(S2), and splitting into multiple files (S3).
Local mutation operators work at the level of procedure bodies—by changing the rel-
ative order of or splitting on multiple lines local variable declarations (L1 and L2),
merging two pre- or postcondition clauses x and y into a conjunctive clause x ∧ y
(L3 and L4), changing the relative order of assertions of the same program element
(L5), and permuting the then and else branches of a conditional (L6).
Generative mutation operators alter redundant information—by adding trivial asser-
tions (G1), and removing quantifier instantiation suggestions (“triggers” in G2).
We stress that our mutation operators do not alter the semantics of a Boogie program
according to the language’s specification [27]: in Boogie, the order of declarations is
immaterial (S1, L1, L2); a procedure’s implementation may be with its declaration or
be separate from it (S2); multiple input files are processed as if they were one (S3);
multiple specification elements are implicitly conjoined, and their relative order does
not matter (L3, L4, L5); a conditional’s branches are mutually exclusive (L6); and true
assertions are irrelevant since Boogie only checks partial correctness (G1).
Triggers. G2 is the only mutation operator that may alter the semantics of a Boogie
program in practice: while triggers are suggestions on how to instantiate quantifiers,
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input : seed program s
input : weight w(o) for each mutation operator o
input : number of mutants NM
output: set of mutants M of s
M ← {s} // initialize pool of mutants to seed
attempts← 0 // number of main loop iterations
while |M | < NM do // repeat until NM mutants are generated
if attempts > MAX_ATTEMPTS then
break
end
p← any program in M
o← any mutation operator // draw with probability w(o)
m← o(p) // apply mutation operator o to p
M ←M ∪ {m} // add m to pool M
attempts← attempts + 1
end
return M
Algorithm 1: Mutant generation algorithm
they are crucial to guide SMT solvers and increase stability in practice [29,7]. There-
fore, we do not consider G2 semantics-preserving; our experiments only apply G2 in
a separate experimental run to give an idea of its impact in isolation.
More mutation operators are possible, but the selection in Tab. 3 should strike a good
balance between effectiveness in setting off brittle behavior and feasibility of studying
the effect of each individual operator in isolation.
Example. In the example of Sec. 2, the program in Fig. 1 is a possible seed—a correct
Boogie program that verifies. Applying mutation operator S1 twice—first to lines 1, 3,
and then to lines 2, 4—generates a mutant where a’s declarations come before h. As
discussed in Sec. 2, this mutant fails verification even if it is equivalent to the seed.
3.2 Mutation Generation
Given a seed s, the generation of mutants repeatedly draws random mutation operators
and applies them to s, or to a previously generated mutant of s, until the desired number
NM of mutants is reached.
Alg. 1 shows the algorithm to generate mutants. The algorithm maintains a pool M
of mutants, which initially only includes the seed s. Each iteration of the main gener-
ation loop proceeds as follows: 1. pick a random program p in the pool M ; 2. select a
random mutation operator o; 3. apply o to p, giving mutant m; 4. add m to pool M (if
it is not already there).
Users can bias the random selection of mutation operators by assigning a weight
w(o) to each mutation operator o in Tab. 3: the algorithm draws an operator with prob-
ability proportional to its weight, and operators with zero weight are never drawn.
Besides the mutation operator selection, there are two other passages of the algo-
rithm where random selection is involved: a program p is drawn uniformly at random
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from M ; and applying an operator o selects uniformly at random program locations
where o can be applied. For example, if o is S1 (swap two top-level declarations), ap-
plying o to p involves randomly selecting two top level declarations in p to be swapped.
Any mutation operator can generate only finitely many mutants; since the genera-
tion is random, it is possible that a newly generated mutant is identical to one that is
already in the pool. In practice, this is not a problem as long as the seed s is not too
small or the enabled operators too restrictive (for example, S2 can only generate 2D
mutants, where D is the number of procedure definitions in s). The generation loop has
an alternative stopping conditions that gives up after MAX_ATTEMPTS iterations that
have failed to generate enough distinct mutants.
Robustness testing. After generating a set M(s) of mutants of a seed s, robustness
testing runs the Boogie tool on each mutant in M(s). If Boogie can verify s but fails to
verify any mutant m ∈ M(s), we have found an instance of brittle behavior: s and m
are equivalent by construction, but the different form in which m is expressed trips up
Boogie and makes verification fail on an otherwise correct program.
3.3 Implementation
We implemented robustness testing as a commandline tool µgie (pronounced “moo-
gie”). µgie implements in Haskell the mutation generation Alg. 1, and extends parts of
Boogaloo’s front-end [38] for parsing and typechecking Boogie programs.
Each mutation operator is implemented—using the lens Haskell package [30]—as
function from Boogie programs to Boogie programs;6 With this design, adding new
mutation operators or changing their order of application is straightforward as it just
uses Haskell’s function composition. Upon terminating, µgie outputs each mutant as a
separate file (or files, if S3 is applied), and annotates each file with a comment header
indicating the seed and the sequence of mutation operators that were applied to generate
the mutant from the seed.
Pretty printing. µgie represents programs by their abstract syntax trees, which are
then rendered using concrete syntax when all mutants have been generated. Such a
pretty printing may introduce small syntactic changes—when the same abstract syn-
tax can be rendered using different syntactic forms. Besides obvious changes in white
spaces, line breaks, and comments (which are removed), µgie’s pretty printer may in-
troduce one normalizing change: functions and procedures without return clause in their
signature get an explicit returns() clause. To further ensure no implicit transformation
is added during pretty printing, we also checked that pretty printing has no effect on the
behavior of Boogie programs (that is, a pretty-printed seed verifies iff the original seed
also verifies).
6 Precisely, the input domain also includes a random seed to select the program elements to
which the operator is applied.
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4 Experimental Evaluation
Robustness testing was initially motivated by our anecdotal experience using interme-
diate verifiers. To rigorously assess to what extent they are indeed brittle, and whether
robustness testing can expose their brittleness, we conducted an experimental evaluation
using µgie. This section describes design and results of these experiments.
4.1 Experimental Design
A run of µgie inputs a seed program s and outputs a number of metamorphic mutants
of s, which are then verified with some tool t (see Fig. 2).
Seed selection. We prepared a curated collection of seeds by selecting Boogie pro-
grams from several different sources, with the goal of having a diverse representation
of how Boogie may be used in practice. Each example belongs to one of six groups
according to its origin and characteristics; Tab. 4a displays basic statistics about them.
Group A contains basic Algorithms (search in an array, binary search trees, etc.) im-
plemented directly in Boogie in our previous work [16]; these are relatively simple, but
non-trivial, verification benchmarks. Group T is a different selection of mainly algo-
rithmic problems (bubble sort, Dutch flag, etc.) included in Boogie’s distribution Tests.
Group E consists of small Examples from our previous work [7] that target the im-
pact of different trigger annotations in Boogie. Group S collects large Boogie programs
that we generated automatically from fixed, repetitive structures (for example, nested
conditionals); in previous work [7] we used these programs to evaluate Scalability.
Groups D and P contain Boogie programs automatically generated by the Dafny [28]
and AutoProof [17] verifiers (which use Boogie as intermediate representation). The
Dafny and Eiffel programs they translate come from the tools’ galleries of verification
benchmarks [9,2]. As we see from the substantial size of the Boogie programs they gen-
erate, Dafny and AutoProof introduce a significant overhead as they include axiomatic
definitions of heap memory and complex types. In all, we collected 135 seeds of size
ranging from just 6 to over 8 500 lines of Boogie code for a total of nearly 260 000 lines
of programs and specifications.
Tool selection. In principle, µgie can be used to test the robustness of any verifier
that can input Boogie programs: besides Boogie, tools such as Boogaloo [38], Sym-
booglix [32], and blt [7]. However, different tools target different kinds of analyses,
and thus typically require different kinds of seeds to be tested properly and meaning-
fully compared. To our knowledge, no tools other than Boogie itself support the full
Boogie language, or are as mature and as effective as Boogie for sound verification (as
opposed to other analyses, such as the symbolic execution performed by Boogaloo and
Symbooglix) on the kinds of examples we selected. We intend to perform a different
evaluation of these tools using µgie in the future, but for consistency and clarity we
focus on the Boogie tool in this paper.
In order to understand whether Boogie’s robustness has changed over its develop-
ment history, our experiments include different versions of Boogie. The Boogie repos-
itory is not very consistent in assigning new version numbers, nor does it tag specific
commits to this effect. As a proxy for that, we searched through the logs of Boogie’s
9
LOC
GROUP # SEEDS MIN MEDIAN MEAN MAX TOTAL
A 10 17 34 44 152 439
D 26 2 000 4 076 4 465 8 533 116 101
E 10 13 18 23 49 230
P 30 986 1 665 1 911 5 737 57 330
S 51 6 126 1 047 7 286 67 006
T 8 11 41 1 662 7 378 18 283
all 135 6 642 1 718 8 533 259 389
(a) Selection of Boogie programs used as seeds: for each
GROUP, the number of programs in that group (# SEEDS), and
their MINimum, MEDIAN, MEAN, MAXimum, and TOTAL size
in non-blank non-comment lines of code. Row all summarizes
measures over all groups.
TOOL COMMIT DATE Z3
BOOGIE 4.1.1 b2d448 2012-09-18 4.1.1
BOOGIE 4.3.2 97fde1 2015-03-10 4.3.2
BOOGIE 4.4.1 75b5be 2015-11-19 4.4.1
BOOGIE 4.5.0 63b360 2017-07-06 4.5.0
(b) Selection of Boogie versions used in the
experiments. For every version of the Boogie
TOOL, the corresponding COMMIT hash in Boo-
gie’s Git repository, the DATE of the commit, and
the matching Z3 version.
Table 4: Boogie programs (“seeds”) and Boogie tool versions used in the experiments.
repository for commit messages that indicate updates to accommodate new features of
the Z3 SMT solver—Boogie’s standard and main backend. For each of four major ver-
sions of Z3 (4.1.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, and 4.5.0), we identified the most recent commit that
refers explicitly to that version (see Tab. 4b); for example, commit 63b360 says “Cali-
brated test output to Z3 version 4.5.0”. Then, we call “Boogie v” the version of Boogie
at the commit mentioning Z3 version v, running Z3 version v as backend.
To better assess whether brittle behavior is attributable to Boogie’s encoding or to
Z3’s behavior, we included two other tools in our experiments: CVC4 refers to the
SMT solver CVC4 v. 1.5 inputting Boogie’s SMT2 encoding of verification condition
(the same input that is normally fed to Z3); Why3 refers to the intermediate verifier
Why3 v. 0.86.3 using Z3 4.3.2 as backend, and inputting WhyML translations of Boogie
programs automatically generated by b2w [1].
DEFINITION DESCRIPTION
S set of all seeds
MO(s) set of all mutants of seed s (generated with mutation operatorsO)
SËt {s ∈ S | t(s)} seeds that pass verification with tool t
MO(s)
é
t {m ∈MO(s) | ¬t(m)} mutants of seed s that fail verification with tool t
SË ét {s ∈ SËt | |MO(s)ét | > 0} passing seeds with at least one mutant failing with tool t
MO(s)
∞
t {m ∈MO(s)ét | t(m) times out} failing mutants of seed s that time out with tool t
# PASS |SËt | number of seeds that pass verification with tool t
# ∃FAIL |SË ét | number of verified seeds with at least one failing mutant with tool t
% ∃FAIL 100 · |SË ét |/|SËt | percentage of verified seeds with at least one failing mutant with tool t
% FAIL 100 · mean
s∈SËt
|MO(s)ét |/|MO(s)| average percentage of failing mutants per verified seed with tool t
% TIMEOUT 100 · mean
s∈SËt
|MO(s)∞t |/|MO(s)| average percentage of timed out mutants per verified seed with tool t
% ∃FAIL 100 · mean
s∈SË ét
|MO(s)ét |/|MO(s)| average percentage of failing mutants per verified seed with some failing mutants
Table 5: Definitions and descriptions of the experimental measures reported in Tab. 6.
Experimental setup. Each experiment has two phases: first, generate mutants for every
seed; then, run Boogie on the mutants and check which mutants still verify.
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For every seed s ∈ S (where S includes all 135 programs summarized in Tab. 4a),
we generate different batches MO(s) of mutants of s by enabling specific mutation
operators O in µgie. Precisely, we generate 12 different batches for every seed:
M∗(s) consists of 100 different mutants of s, generated by picking uniformly at ran-
dom among all mutation operators in Tab. 3 except G2 (that is, each mutation
operator gets the same positive weight, and G2 gets weight zero);
MJ(s), for J one of the 11 operators in Tab. 3, consists of 50 different mutants of s
generated by only applying mutation operator J (that is, J gets a positive weight,
and all other operators get weight zero).
Batch M∗ demonstrates the effectiveness of robustness testing with general settings;
then, the smaller batches MJ focus on the individual effectiveness of one mutation
operator at a time. Operator G2 is only used in isolation (and not at all in M∗) since it
may change the semantics of programs indirectly by guiding quantifier instantiation.
Let t be a tool (a Boogie version in Tab. 4b, or another verifier). For every seed
s ∈ S, we run t on s and on all mutantsMO(s) in each batch. For a run of t on program
p (seed or mutant), we write t(p) if t verifies p successfully; and ¬t(p) if t fails to verify
p (because it times out, or returns with failure). Based on this basic data, we measure
robustness by counting the number of verified seeds whose mutants fail verification:
see the measures defined in Tab. 5 and the results described in detail in Sec. 4.2. As an
additional check that the mutation operators do not change the semantics of programs,
we ascertained that all mutants pass parsing and other syntactic checks.
To reduce the running time in practical usage scenarios, one may stop verification of
a seed’s mutants as soon as one of them fails verification, or even alternate seed mutation
and verification steps to avoid generating mutants after the first failure. In this paper’s
experiments, however, we decided to run verification exhaustively on every mutant in
order to collect detailed information about the effectiveness of robustness testing.
Running times. The experiments ran on a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS GNU/Linux box with
Intel 8-core i7-4790 CPU at 3.6 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. Generating the mutants took
about 15 minutes for the batchM∗ and 10 minutes for each batchMJ . Each verification
run was given a timeout of 20 seconds, after which it was forcefully terminated by the
scheduler of GNU parallel [40]. For replicability, seeds and summary output of the
experimental runs are available online [35].
4.2 Experimental Results
Overall results: batch M∗. Our experiments, whose detailed results are in Tab. 6,
show that robustness testing is effective in exposing brittle behavior, which is recurrent
in Boogie: for 12% of the seeds that pass verification,7 there is at least one mutant in
batch M∗ that fails verification.
Not all seeds are equally prone to brittleness: while on average only 3% of one
seed’s mutants fail verification, it is considerably easier to trip up seeds that are suscep-
tible to brittle behavior (that is such that at least one mutant fails verification): 27% of
mutants per such seeds fail verification.
7 For clarity, we initially focus on Boogie 4.5.0, and later discuss differences with other versions.
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BATCH M∗ # ∃FAIL OF MJ
GROUP TOOL # PASS # ∃FAIL % ∃FAIL % FAIL % TIMEOUT % ∃FAIL S1 S2 S3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 G1 G2
A 4.1.1 10 2 20% 9% 5% 45% 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
4.3.2 10 1 10% 4% 0% 42% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
4.4.1 10 1 10% 4% 0% 42% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
4.5.0 10 1 10% 4% 0% 42% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
CVC4 6 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WHY3 7 0 0% 0% 0% –
D 4.1.1 0 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3.2 24 7 29% 7% 4% 23% 6 0 5 0 0 5 4 4 0 3 17
4.4.1 24 7 29% 7% 5% 23% 6 0 5 0 0 5 4 4 0 3 17
4.5.0 24 6 25% 8% 6% 33% 5 0 5 0 0 8 4 4 0 1 17
CVC4 0 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WHY3 0 0 – – – –
E 4.1.1 5 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4.3.2 7 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4.4.1 7 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4.5.0 7 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
CVC4 4 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
WHY3 7 0 0% 0% 0% –
P 4.1.1 0 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3.2 14 6 43% 1% 0% 2% 4 0 7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 10
4.4.1 13 5 38% 1% 0% 2% 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
4.5.0 13 5 38% 1% 0% 2% 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
CVC4 0 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WHY3 0 0 – – – –
S 4.1.1 51 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3.2 51 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.4.1 51 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.0 51 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CVC4 51 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WHY3 40 2 5% 1% 1% 25%
T 4.1.1 8 1 12% 5% 5% 39% 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
4.3.2 8 1 12% 8% 8% 62% 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
4.4.1 8 1 12% 8% 8% 60% 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
4.5.0 8 1 12% 12% 12% 96% 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
CVC4 4 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
WHY3 3 0 0% 0% 0% –
all 4.1.1 74 3 4% 2% 1% 43% 2 0 2 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 4
4.3.2 114 15 13% 2% 2% 18% 11 0 13 0 0 7 7 6 0 4 31
4.4.1 113 14 12% 2% 2% 20% 10 0 12 0 0 6 6 6 0 4 30
4.5.0 113 13 12% 3% 2% 27% 10 0 12 0 0 9 6 6 0 2 30
CVC4 65 0 0% 0% 0% – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
WHY3 57 2 4% 1% 1% 25%
Table 6: Experimental results of robustness testing with µgie. For each GROUP of seeds, for each TOOL: number of
seeds passing verification (# PASS), number and percentage of passing seeds for which at least one mutant fails verification
(# ∃FAIL and % ∃FAIL), average percentage of mutants per passing seed that fail verification (% FAIL), average percentage
of mutants per passing seed that time out (% TIMEOUT), average percentage of mutants that fail verification per passing seed
with at least one failing mutant (% FAIL). The middle section of the table records experiments with batch M∗; each of the
11 rightmost columns records experiments with batchMJ , for J one of the mutation operators in Tab. 3.
When the verifier times out on a mutant, it may be because: i) the timeout is it-
self unstable and due to random noise in the runtime environment; ii) the mutant takes
longer to verify than the seed, but may still be verified given longer time; iii) verifica-
tion time diverges. We ruled out i) by repeating experiments 10 times, and reporting a
timeout only if all 10 repetitions time out. Thus, we can generally consider the time-
outs in Tab. 6 indicative of a genuine degrading of performance in verification—which
affected 3% of one seed’s mutants on average.
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Boogie versions. There is little difference between Boogie versions, with the excep-
tion of Boogie 4.1.1. This older version does not support some language features used
extensively in many larger examples that also tend to be more brittle (groups D and
P). As a result, the percentage of verified seeds with mutants that fail verification is
spuriously lower (4%) but only because the experiments with Boogie 4.1.1 dodged the
harder problems and performed similarly to the other Boogie versions on the simpler
ones. Leaving the older Boogie version 4.1.1 aside, our experiments leave open the
question of whether robustness has significantly improved in recent versions of Boogie.
Intermediate verifier vs. backend. Is the brittleness we observed in our experiments
imputable to Boogie or really to Z3? To shed light on this question, we tried to verify
every seed and mutant using CVC4 instead of Z3 with Boogie’s encoding; and using
Why3 on a translation [1] of Boogie’s input. Since the seeds are programs optimized for
Boogie verification, CVC4 and Why3 can correctly process only about half of the seeds
that Boogie can. This gives us too little evidence to answer the question conclusively:
while both CVC4 and Why3 seem to be more robust than Boogie, they can verify none
of the brittle seeds (that is, verified seeds with at least one failing mutant), and thus
behave as robustly as Boogie on the programs that both tools can process.8 As suggested
by the simple example of Sec. 2 (where Why3 was indeed more robust than Boogie),
it is really the interplay of Boogie and Z3 that determines brittle behavior. While SMT
solvers have their own quirks, Boogie is meant to provide a stable intermediate layer;
in all, it seems fair to say that Boogie is at least partly responsible for the brittleness.
Program groups. Robustness varies greatly across groups, according to features and
complexity of the seeds that are mutated. Groups D and P are the most brittle: about 1/3
of passing seeds in D, and about 2/5 of passing seeds in P, have at least one mutant that
fails verification. Seeds in D and P are large and complex programs generated by Dafny
and AutoProof; they include extensive definitions with plenty of generic types, complex
axioms, and instantiations. The brittleness of these programs reflects the hardness of
verifying strong specifications and feature-rich programming languages: the Boogie
encoding must be optimized in every aspect if it has to be automatically verifiable; even
a modicum of clutter—introduced by µgie—may jeopardize successful verification.
By the same token, groups A, E, and T’s programs are more robust because they
have a smaller impact surface in terms of features and size. Group S’s programs are
uniformly robust because they have simple, repetitive structure and weak specifications
despite their significant size.
Mutation operators and batches MJ . Fig. 7 and the rightmost columns of Tab. 6
explore the relative effectiveness of each mutation operator. S2, L1, L2, and L6 could
not generate any failing mutant—suggesting that Boogie’s encoding of procedure dec-
larations, of local variables, and of conditionals is fairly robust. In contrast, all other
operators could generate at least one failing mutant; Fig. 7 indicates that L3 and S3
generated failing mutants for respectively 2 seeds and 1 seed that were robust in batch
M∗ (using all mutation operators with the same frequency)—indicating that mutation
operators are complementary to a certain extent in the kind of brittleness they can ex-
8 Additionally, Why3 times out on 51 mutants of 2 seeds in group S; this seems to reflect an
ineffective translation performed by b2w [1] rather than brittleness of Why3.
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pose. Since every seed that M∗ trips up can also be tripped up by a single operator,
combining multiple mutation operators does not seem to be necessary for successful
robustness testing (although predicting which operators will be effective may be hard).
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Fig. 7: For each of 16 verified seeds with at least one failing mutant with Boogie 4.5.0, which
batches all exclusively include a failing mutant of those seeds. G2 is excluded and analyzed
separately; S2, L1, L2, L6 could not generate any failing mutant; L4 generated failing mutants for
a strict subset of those in M∗; G1 generated failing mutants for a strict subset of those in ML5 .
Tab. 8 gives information about the frequency of different mutation operators in fail-
ing mutants of batch M∗. Differences are consistent with the results of batches MJ—
which provide more direct evidence. As usual, the numbers for Boogie 4.1.1 are dif-
ferent because of a much smaller number of passing seeds on which the statistics are
computed, which in turn is a result of Boogie 4.1.1’s more limited supported features.
Failures. Overall, 13 brittle seeds are revealed by 350 failing mutants in M∗ with
Boogie 4.5.0. Failures are of three kinds: a) timeouts (6 seeds, 252 mutants); b) type
errors (5 seeds, 10 mutants); c) explicit verification failures (2 seeds, 88 mutants).
Timeouts mainly occur in group D (5 seeds), where size and complexity of the code
are such that any mutation that slows down verification may hit the timeout limit;
verification of some mutants seems to be non-terminating, whereas others are just
slowed down by some tens of seconds. One exception is BQueue in group T, whose
implementation of a queue in the style of dynamic frames is not particularly large
(322 lines) but includes many assertions that take time to verify. Some mutants
verify if given longer time; in fact, group T’s programs are otherwise very robust,
probably because they are part of Boogie’s test suite, and thus any change in Boogie
is checked against the same examples to ensure they still verify.
Type errors all occur in group P and only when mutation S3 splits the seed in a way that
procedure update_heap (part of AutoProof’s heap axiomatization) ends up being
declared after its first usage; in this case, Boogie cannot correctly instantiate the
procedure’s generic type, which triggers a type error even before Z3 is involved.
Even though AutoProof’s heap encoding is based on Dafny’s and hence somewhat
similar to it, Dafny is immune to such faulty behavior.
14
% FAILING MUTANTS IN BATCH M∗ PER MUTATION OPERATOR
GROUP TOOL L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 S1 S2 S3 G1
A 4.1.1 7% 43% 36% 57% 34% 6% 91% 33% 18% 38%
4.3.2 14% 86% 43% 69% 48% 12% 90% 12% 14% 40%
4.4.1 14% 86% 43% 69% 48% 12% 90% 12% 14% 40%
4.5.0 14% 86% 43% 69% 48% 12% 90% 12% 14% 40%
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 – – – – – – – – – –
D 4.1.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.3.2 0% 0% 56% 63% 80% 0% 70% 0% 68% 41%
4.4.1 0% 0% 56% 62% 80% 0% 70% 0% 69% 41%
4.5.0 0% 0% 60% 62% 77% 0% 64% 0% 61% 49%
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 – – – – – – – – – –
E 4.1.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.3.2 – – – – – – – – – –
4.4.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.5.0 – – – – – – – – – –
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 – – – – – – – – – –
P 4.1.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.3.2 0% 0% 38% 18% 64% 0% 26% 0% 88% 49%
4.4.1 0% 0% 30% 17% 57% 0% 27% 0% 100% 43%
4.5.0 0% 0% 30% 17% 57% 0% 27% 0% 100% 43%
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 – – – – – – – – – –
S 4.1.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.3.2 – – – – – – – – – –
4.4.1 – – – – – – – – – –
4.5.0 – – – – – – – – – –
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 5% 32% 44% 52% 0% 100% 59% 28% 29% 33%
T 4.1.1 10% 26% 18% 92% 28% 0% 44% 26% 10% 51%
4.3.2 10% 25% 21% 90% 27% 0% 41% 30% 17% 60%
4.4.1 8% 26% 21% 90% 28% 0% 41% 31% 18% 61%
4.5.0 11% 27% 25% 74% 20% 0% 47% 30% 28% 59%
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 – – – – – – – – – –
all 4.1.1 8% 37% 30% 69% 32% 4% 75% 31% 15% 42%
4.3.2 2% 7% 45% 47% 68% 1% 52% 3% 69% 45%
4.4.1 2% 8% 43% 49% 66% 1% 54% 3% 72% 43%
4.5.0 2% 9% 44% 46% 62% 1% 50% 3% 70% 47%
CVC4 – – – – – – – – – –
WHY3 5% 32% 44% 52% 0% 100% 59% 28% 29% 33%
Table 8: Analysis of mutation operators in batch M∗. For each GROUP of seeds, for each TOOL, for each mutation
operator OP, column OP reports the percentage of failing mutants of passing seeds that were generated by applying one or
more times operator OP (possibly in combination with other mutation operators).
Verification failures occur in seeds of group A and D. In particular, a binary search
tree implementation in group A fails verification when the relative order of two
postconditions is swapped by L5; while Why3 cannot prove the whole example, it
can prove the brittle procedure alone regardless of the postcondition order. Group
D’s solution to problem 3 in the VerifyThis 2015 competition [22] fails verification
when two preconditions are merged into a conjunctive one by L3.
In all, it is clear that Boogie’s encoding is quite sensitive to the order of declarations
and assertions even when it should not matter.
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Triggers. Remember that mutation operator G2 is the only one that modifies triggers,
and was only applied in isolation in a separate set of experiments. As we expected from
previous work [29], altering triggers is likely to make verification fail (30 seeds and 276
mutants overall; 20 seeds are only brittle if triggers are modified); most of these failures
(26 seeds and 250 mutants) are timeouts, since removing triggers is likely to at least
slow down verification—if not make it diverge. Operator G2 is very effective at expos-
ing brittleness mainly with the complex examples in groups D and P, which include
numerous axioms and extensive quantification patterns. Group E’s programs are a bit
special because they are brittle—they are designed to be so—but are only affected by
mutation operators that remove the trigger annotations on which they strongly depend;
in contrast, they are robust against all other mutation operators.
Failing seeds. Tab. 9 is the counterpart of Tab. 6, showing if random mutations may
change a seed that fails verification into one that passes it. Unsurprisingly, this does not
happen very often: there are only 2 seeds that go from failing to passing with random
mutations. One in group E is similar to the example of Sec. 2 but where the seed’s order
of declarations fails verification, and swapping two of them restores verifiability; one
in group P is sum_and_max.bpl, which robustly verifies with Boogie 4.3.2 but times
out with more recent Boogie versions. AutoProof’s encoding was fine-tuned based on
Boogie 4.3.2, which explains why it may be sensitive to using newer Boogie versions.
5 Related Work
Robustness. This paper’s robustness testing aims at detecting so-called butterfly ef-
fects [29]—macroscopic changes in a verifier’s output in response to minor modifi-
cations of its input. Program provers often incur volatile behavior because they use
automated theorem provers—such as SMT solvers—which in turn rely on heuristics
to handle efficiently, in many practical cases, complex proofs in undecidable logics.
Matching triggers—heuristics to guide quantifier instantiation—are especially prone to
misfire in response to tiny changes in the input, as observed in previous work [29,7] and
confirmed by our experiments in Sec. 4.2.
The notion of robustness originates from dynamical systems theory [15,25]. While
robustness is well understood for linear systems, nonlinear systems may manifest un-
predictable loss of robustness that are hard to analyze and prevent. In this context, real
time temporal logics have been proposed as a way of formalizing and analyzing behav-
ioral properties that are satisfied robustly [12].
Random testing. Our approach uses testing to expose brittle behavior of verifiers.
While testing can only try out finitely many inputs—and thus can only prove the pres-
ence of errors, as remarked in one of Dijkstra’s most memorable quotes [11]—it is an
invaluable analysis techniques, which requires relatively little effort to be applied. By
automatically generating test inputs, random testing has proved to be extremely effec-
tive at detecting subtle errors in programs completely automatically. Random testing
can generate instances of complex data types by recursively building them accord-
ing to their inductive structure—as it has been done for functional [8,13]and object-
oriented [36,34]programming languages. Random testing has also been successfully
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BATCH M∗
GROUP TOOL # FAIL # ∃PASS % ∃PASS % PASS % ∃PASS
A 4.1.1 0 0 – – –
4.3.2 0 0 – – –
4.4.1 0 0 – – –
4.5.0 0 0 – – –
CVC4 4 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 3 0 0% 0% –
D 4.1.1 26 0 0% 0% –
4.3.2 2 0 0% 0% –
4.4.1 2 0 0% 0% –
4.5.0 2 0 0% 0% –
CVC4 26 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 26 0 0% 0% –
E 4.1.1 5 0 0% 0% –
4.3.2 3 1 33% 6% 17%
4.4.1 3 1 33% 6% 17%
4.5.0 3 1 33% 6% 17%
CVC4 6 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 3 0 0% 0% –
P 4.1.1 30 0 0% 0% –
4.3.2 16 0 0% 0% –
4.4.1 17 1 6% 1% 18%
4.5.0 17 1 6% 0% 5%
CVC4 30 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 30 0 0% 0% –
S 4.1.1 0 0 – – –
4.3.2 0 0 – – –
4.4.1 0 0 – – –
4.5.0 0 0 – – –
CVC4 0 0 – – –
WHY3 11 0 0% 0% –
T 4.1.1 0 0 – – –
4.3.2 0 0 – – –
4.4.1 0 0 – – –
4.5.0 0 0 – – –
CVC4 4 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 5 0 0% 0% –
all 4.1.1 61 0 0% 0% –
4.3.2 21 1 5% 1% 17%
4.4.1 22 2 9% 2% 17%
4.5.0 22 2 9% 1% 11%
CVC4 70 0 0% 0% –
WHY3 78 0 0% 0% –
Table 9: For each GROUP of seeds, for each TOOL: number of seeds failing verification (# FAIL), number and percentage
of failing seeds for which at least one mutant passes verification (#/% ∃PASS), average percentage of mutants per failing
seed that pass verification (% PASS), average percentage of mutants that pass verification per failing seed with at least one
passing mutant (% PASS). All data in the table is about experiments with batchM∗.
applied to security testing—where it is normally called “fuzzing” [18]—as well as
to compiler testing [41,26]—where well-formed programs are randomly generated ac-
cording to the input language’s grammar.
Mutation testing. This paper’s robustness testing is a form of random testing, in that it
applies random mutation operators to transform a program into an equivalent one. The
terminology and the idea of applying mutation operators to transform between vari-
ants of a program come from mutation testing [23]. However, the goals of traditional
mutation testing and of this paper’s robustness testing are specular. Mutation testing
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is normally used to assess the robustness of a test suite—by applying error-inducing
mutations to correct programs, and ascertaining whether the tests fail on the mutated
programs. In contrast, we use mutation testing to assess the robustness of a verifier—by
applying semantic-preserving mutations to correct (verified) programs, and ascertaining
whether the mutated programs still verify. Therefore, the mutation operators of standard
mutation testing introduce bugs in a way that is representative of common programming
mistakes; the mutation operators of robustness testing (see Tab. 3) do not alter correct-
ness but merely represent alternative syntax expressing the same behavior in a way that
is representative of different styles of programming.
Metamorphic testing. In testing, generating inputs is only half of the work; one also
has to compare the system’s output with the expected output to determine whether a
test is passing or failing. The definition of correct expected output is given by an or-
acle [3]. The more complex the properties we are testing for, the more complex the
oracle: a crash oracle (did the program crash?) is sufficient to test for simple errors such
as out-of-bound memory access; finding more complex errors requires some form of
specification [21] of expected behavior—for example in the form of assertions [5,37].
Even when directly building an oracle is as complex as writing a correct program,
there are still indirect ways of extrapolating whether an output is correct. In differential
testing [33], there are variants of the program under test; under the assumption that not
all variants have the same bugs, one can feed the same input to every variant, and stip-
ulate that the output returned by the majority is the expected one—and any outlier is
likely buggy. Differential testing has been applied to testing compilers [41], looking for
the compiler that generates the executable that behaves differently from the others on
the same input. In metamorphic testing [6,39], an input is transformed into an equiva-
lent one according to metamorphic relations (for example, the inputs x and −x should
be equivalent inputs to a function computing the absolute value); equivalent inputs that
determine different outputs are indicative of error. Our robustness testing applies muta-
tion operators that determine identity metamorphic relations between Boogie programs,
since they only change syntactic details and not the semantics of programs.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Our experiments with µgie confirm the intuition—bred by frequently using it in our
work—that Boogie is prone to brittle behaviour. How can we shield users from this
brittle behavior, thus improving the usability of verification technology?
Program verifiers that use Boogie as an intermediate representation achieve this
goal to some extent: the researchers who built the verifiers have developed an intuitive
understanding of Boogie’s idiosyncrasies, and have encoded this informal knowledge
into their tools. End users do not have to worry about Boogie’s brittleness but can count
on the tools to provide an encoding of their input programs that has a good chance of
being effective. In contrast, developers of program verifiers still have to know how to
interact with Boogie and be aware of its peculiarities.
Robustness testing may play a role not only in exposing brittle behavior—the focus
of this paper—but in precisely tracking down the sources of brittleness, thus helping
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to debug them. To this end, we plan to address minimization and equivalency detection
of mutants in future work. The idea is that the number of failing mutants that we get
by running µgie are not directly effective as debugging aids, because it takes a good
deal of manual analysis to pinpoint the precise sources of failure in large programs with
several mutations. Instead, we will apply techniques such as delta debugging [42] to
reduce the size of a failing mutant as much as possible while still triggering failing
behavior in Boogie. Failing mutants of minimal size will be easier to inspect by hand,
and thus will point to concrete aspects of the Boogie translation that could be made
more robust.
To further investigate to what extent it is Z3 that is brittle, and to what extent it is
Boogie’s encoding of verification condition—an aspect only partially addressed by this
paper’s experiments—we will apply robustness testing directly to SMT problems, also
to understand how Boogie’s encoding can be made more robust.
Robustness testing could become a useful technique for developers working on dif-
ferent layers of verification infrastructure, to help them track down sources of brittle-
ness during development and ultimately making verification technology easier to use
and more broadly applicable.
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